State v. Shanahan Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 45716 by unknown
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
_______________________ 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
_______________________ 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF JEFFERSON 
_______________________ 
HONORABLE ALAN C. STEPHENS, PRESIDING 
_______________________ 
         
 
RUSSELL J. SPENCER    CRAIG H. DURHAM 
Deputy Attorney General    Ferguson Durham, PLLC 
Criminal Law Division    223 N. 6th Street, Suite 325 
P.O. Box 83720     Boise, Idaho, 83702 
Boise, Idaho, 83720     (208)-345-5183 ext. 1000 
(208)-334-4534     chd@fergusondurham.com 
ecf@ag.idaho.gov     
        























Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... ii 
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................1 
REPLY ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................2 
I.      The constitutional rules from Miller and Montgomery apply to this case .........2 
 
II.     Res judicata is not a bar to this Court’s consideration of a claim that, in 
light of an intervening and material change in the law, Mr. Shanahan’s 











TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Cases 
Adamcik v. State, 163 Idaho 114, 408 P.3d 474 (2017) ............................................................... 4 
Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666 (Wyo. 2018) .................................................................................... 3 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) ................................................................................ passim 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) ................................................................................. 6 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002) .............................................................. 5 
Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 395 P.3d 1246 (2017) ............................................................... 4 
State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.3d 1305 (1995) ............................................................. 6 
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) .................................................... passim 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) ........................................... passim 
Peterson v. State, 193 So.3d 1034 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) ....................................................... 3 
State v. Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 994 P.2d 1059 (Ct. App. 1999) ........................................... 6 






Appellant Christopher Shanahan relies on the facts and arguments in his 
opening brief, and will not repeat those here, but he does wish to take this opportunity 
to reply to a few topics raised in the State’s brief.  
The State contends primarily that because Mr. Shanahan did not receive a formal 
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, any argument that his life 
sentence, with 35 years fixed, is now illegal due to fundamental changes in 
constitutional law related to juvenile sentencing fails. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 5-6.) Mr. 
Shanahan respectfully disagrees and contends that the State overlooks several core 
constitutional principles from Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery that apply to his 
case.  
The State also asserts that a claim that Mr. Shanahan’s sentence amounts to cruel 
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment based on disproportionality is 
barred by res judicata because an Eighth Amendment proportionality claim was raised 
in Mr. Shanahan’s direct appeal under then existing law. (Brief of Respondent, pp. 8-9.) 
This is not the same claim, however, due to subsequent and material changes in the law. 







The constitutional rules from Miller and Montgomery apply to this case.  
 The State argues that, “Miller only applies to juvenile offenders who were 
sentenced to fixed life terms. Shanahan was not sentenced to a fixed life term. Miller, 
therefore, does not apply to Shanahan’s case or sentence.” (Brief of Respondent, p. 5.) In 
pressing its argument, the State reduces the constitutional law to an overly simplistic 
baseline and ignores core principles and reasoning from Miller and Montgomery, which 
were themselves a culmination of over a decade of legal transformation related to 
juvenile sentencing.  
 The primary rule to emerge from the line of Supreme Court cases set out in Mr. 
Shanahan’s opening brief is the children are constitutionally different than adults and 
must be sentenced differently. Scientific research, and now constitutional law, tell us 
this. Children and adolescents are impulsive. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2467‐68 
(2012). They can be reckless. Id. They take risks without appreciating the consequences. 
Id. They are more prone to a negative family environment and peer influences. Id. They 
are at a disadvantage in dealing with police and prosecutors, including in determining 
whether to plead guilty. Id. The do not mature mentally and morally until their mid-20s. 
Id. All of these characteristics diminish their culpability. Id. at 2465. The typical equation 
for sentencing adult offenders must necessarily yield to an altogether different calculus 
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for juveniles. For instance, deterrence is less effective on youthful offenders. Id. 
Childhood characteristics also weaken a rationale for extreme punitiveness. Id. at 2466. 
And there is a much stronger likelihood of change and rehabilitation. Id. at 2465. 
 In short, children whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth are in a 
constitutionally distinct class, separate and apart from adults who commit the same 
crime. Christopher Shanahan is a member that class.  
 Other state courts have held the principles and reasoning from Roper to Graham 
to Miller to Montgomery apply to cases in which a juvenile offender was sentenced to 
something other than life without the possibility of parole, see Brief of Appellant, pp. 12-
14 (discussing cases), and this Court should follow their lead. See also Peterson v. State, 
193 So.3d 1034, 1038-39 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (“we conclude that the court's 
admonition that a constitutional sentence is one that provides a meaningful opportunity 
for early release is not satisfied simply because the juvenile may be geriatrically released 
from prison at some point before the conclusion of his or her statistical or actuarial life 
expectancy.”)(emphasis in original); Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666 (Wyo. 2018) (reaffirming 
that a lengthy term for years can be the “functional equivalent” of a life sentence 
triggering Miller review, holding that there is a presumption against life sentences for 
juveniles, and setting out certain procedures for sentencing juveniles.) 
 Nevertheless, the State contends that even if Miller were to apply to this case, Mr. 
Shanahan received constitutionally adequate consideration of the attributes of youth. 
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(Brief of Respondent, pp. 6-7.) As the State points out, Mr. Shanahan’s trial counsel 
presented some mental health testimony related to aspects of Mr. Shanahan’s personal 
development and maturity. (Id.) And, in its written findings regarding the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances (as if this were a death-eligible case), the trial 
court noted Mr. Shanahan’s age and expressed “hope” that he could be rehabilitated. 
(Appeal No. 23, 965, Clerk’s Rec., p. 191.) But the court more than negated even that 
snippet of consideration with a notation that “murders continue in our society and, 
alarmingly, they are all too often committed by teenagers.” (Id.)  
This review is simply not the type of searching inquiry that the Eighth 
Amendment requires. As Mr. Shanahan wrote in his opening brief, the distinction that 
the Idaho Supreme Court has previously made when reviewing pre-Miller sentences is 
whether a trial court adequately considered the developmental state of an adolescent’s 
brain compared to an adult and how youth are more prone to impulsivity and more 
likely to be able to be rehabilitated. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 15-18) (citing and comparing 
Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 223, 395 P.3d 1246, 1258 (2017) and Adamcik v. State, 163 
Idaho 114, 408 P.3d 474, 488 (2017), with Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417, 398 P.3d 150 
(2017)). In this case, the trial court was presented with some mental health evidence of 
Mr. Shanahan’s personal development, but not it was not presented with evidence 
about, nor did it meaningfully weigh and assess, adolescent development generally and 
how that bears on the likelihood of rehabilitation compared to an adult. In the mid-
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1990s, that was not on the constitutional radar. Now it is mandated. Mr. Shanahan’s 
case is more like Windom in that regard, and not like Johnson or Adamcik. 
II. 
Res judicata is not a bar to this Court’s consideration of a claim that, in light of an 
intervening and material change in the law, Mr. Shanahan’s sentence is 
disproportionate and independently violates the Eighth Amendment.  
 The State next asserts that because an Eighth Amendment claim was raised on 
direct appeal in 1999, in which Mr. Shanahan’s counsel argued that the sentence was 
disproportionate to the offense, “re-litigation of this issue is barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata.” (Brief of Respondent, p. 8.) 
  “Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel).” Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 
(2002). “Under principles of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the 
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action 
between the same parties upon the same claim.” Id. (citation omitted). The doctrine of 
res judicata contains narrow exceptions, however, including “ineffective assistance of 
counsel, newly discovered evidence, or changes in the controlling law.” State v. 
Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 618, 903 P.3d 1305, 1315 (1995) (citing Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988)). 
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 That last exception mentioned in Lankford applies here. There has been a 
fundamental shift in the law since the time that this claim was initially raised and 
decided. As such, this is not the same claim. The constitutional analysis that must be 
applied when a juvenile is sentenced to a lengthy term for years – regardless whether it 
is a life sentence – must be viewed through a much different lens than the one that the 
Court of Appeals used. There, it focused heavily on the facts of the offense. State v. 
Shanahan, 133 Idaho 896, 901, 994 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Ct. App. 1999). Now, courts are 
required to take into consideration the attendant characteristics of youth, which 
squarely informs the individual juvenile’s level of culpability, the proper role of 
deterrence and punishment, and the capacity for rehabilitation, in ways that were not a 
requirement at the time of appellate review in the 1990s.   
In fact, in 2012 the Miller Court brushed aside strict adherence to the 
longstanding disproportionality test from Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), 
noting that it was inapposite. The Court wrote, “Harmelin had nothing to do with 
children and did not purport to apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile 
offenders. We have by now held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule 
permissible for adults may not be so for children.” Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012). 
Just as “death is different” in capital case review “children are different too.” Id. 
This Eighth Amendment claim is a new one. For that reason, this Court should 
conclude that res judicata does not prohibit consideration of the merits anew. Mr. 
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Shanahan’s youthful characteristics fit in all of the categories set out in Graham, Miller, 
and Montgomery, as he has addressed in his opening brief. (Brief of Appellant, pp. 21-
22.) Taking those factors in consideration, a sentence of life in prison with 35 years 
fixed, imposed on a juvenile who was 15 years old when he committed this crime is far 
beyond excessive and is cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Shanahan requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order and 
remand for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted on this 27th day of November, 2018. 
 
       
      Craig Durham 
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